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Reality in Literature 
Eliseo Vivas 
1 
In this paper I am asking whether, and in what sense, we can speak of the 
reality of works of literature?works to which I shall refer hereafter by the generic 
term of 
"poetry." We have before us two problems, both of which need to be 
treated with 
circumspection. Therefore, I must treat them in an abstract, purely 
theoretical way. The problems are of two quite different kinds: one is psycho 
logical, and the other ontological. But although distinct, they are, nevertheless, inti 
mately related, as I hope to show towards the end of the paper. 
In 
representative art the psychological problem does not 
seem to present 
extraordinary difficulties. In poetry, representative painting and sculpture, the 
object of the work?what the work is about?bears some sort of resemblance to 
the furniture of the daily world: to men and their actions, to the things they 
use, and to the ambient medium, artificial and natural, in which they live. For 
this reason we have to say in the case of poetry and of representative art, that 
their objects symbolize the same kind of reality as that actually possessed by 
mental 
objects. Insofar as this is true, we have no unique problem. A problem 
arises when the claim to perception is seriously entered. Sometimes our trans 
actions with poetry convey a heightened feeling of reality, a feeling that the 
ordinary world does not usually convey. It is an experience difficult to give 
an 
account of. It may be a close relative to the mystical experience?I do not know. 
At its peak, the reader disappears, and all there is, is the "thereness" of the 
object of the poem. I call the event a revelation, in the etymological meaning of 
the term: a tearing of the veil, a presentation of intense vividness of what the 
poem is about. The work before us stands out radiantly, with an effulgence that 
claims that we have taken a step upwards, into 
a 
reality that is usually hidden 
from us in our daily world. The semi-transparent film that stands between 
us and 
the furniture of the world in which we live daily has dissolved. We move up, to 
yield with anticipation to the increasing radiance that shows itself to us. The 
claim that the revealed 
object makes?and I am using my words with some care? 
cannot be disregarded, however we choose to interpret it. Let me press into use 
for our purposes a vivid phrase that William James used in his discussion of the 
sense of reality in a slightly different context: "a man's soul will sweat with con 
viction" when "his entire faculty of attention is absorbed" by a poem. Its object 
seems, as he puts it, more "utterly utter" what it is, than at other times. Thus 
James is one of our witnesses for the fact that poetry can convey on the oc 
casion of total absorption in it a sense of superior reality. And kindly note that 
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while I have modified slightly some?not all?of James's words, I claim to be 
swimming, so to speak, in the mainstream of his thought 
on this matter. 
The actuality of this sort of experience has been denied by some writers and 
ridiculed crudely by others. But in addition to the testimony of William James 
that of many other writers could be added: That of Vernon Lee for instance, 
and of Henri Delacroix. Indeed, except for some critics, whose exclusive interest 
in poetry seems to be to make it raw material for their professional activity, the 
experience is not totally uncommon, although rare, to readers of poetry and 
people interested in the other arts. 
In view of the evidence, then, the question does not seem to me to be about 
the actuality of the heightened sense of reality. Are we faced, let us ask, with a 
claim somewhat similar to that made by Plato in The Symposium and in The 
Seventh Epistle? Or with that made by Rudolph Otto when he writes about 
the 
experience of the numinous? In still different terms, is the claim that in rare 
aesthetic transactions poems disclose to us ontologically different kinds of reality 
than that possessed by the stones that the cultivated philistine kicks? Or can the 
experience be explained psychologically? My answer is that while much of the 
"utterly utter" sense of reality of the object of the poem can be explained suc 
cessfully by the same means used by James to explain the results of intoxication 
with nitrous oxide, the claim cannot be exhaustively explained, in the case of 
poetry, by this means. Otherwise stated, I am going to show that the ontological 
problem cannot be altogether dismissed, however far psychology can go towards 
an 
explanation of the sense of reality given us by the poem. If we pursue the 
problem of the informed substance of poetry far enough, without regard to reg 
nant philosophical orthodoxies, and 
come at the problem from a different stand 
point, we shall run into complications that call for a metaphysic or ontology that 
is forced to posit at least one realm besides that of existence 
or the 
spacio 
temporal realm?the only realm allowed us today by the dominant climate of 
philosophical opinion. 
2 
I wish I had not found it necessary in the past to reiterate what I am going to 
say again. The iteration cannot be avoided, since it is at the heart of my doctrine. 
When a poem functions as poetry, it functions as a presentation, which is to say 
that it does not refer 
explicitly beyond itself. It is autonomous because the priv 
ileges that govern it?or if you prefer, the loose conventions 
that guide its 
making?are not imposed by external authority but 
are the result of intrinsic 
exigencies acknowledged by the maker and his readers. Besides being 
auton 
omous, the poem is also self-sufficient, but in a qualified sense. The qualifica 
tion may appear to be a silly tautology. But the failure to consider it leads to 
the misinterpretation of the nature of poetry. To read a poem with full enjoy 
ment calls for an arduous preparation. This should go without saying it. One needs 
to know first the language of the poem. But this demand is not one that is easily 
met. Consider that most of you have taken a lifetime to learn the language, and 
those who have not learnt it at their mothers' knees can never compete in some 
117 Criticism 
important respects with those who did. Learning the language of a poem will 
often include learning special languages?that of Shakespeare, for instance. It 
includes a full, concrete, detailed knowledge of whatever is to be found on a 
page. Indeed, adequate knowledge of a language can hardly be distinguished from 
knowledge of the culture for which the language is a medium of apprehension, 
communication, and communion. Given knowledge of the language, a poem can be 
there, for the reader, to enter into a poetic transaction with it, that may lead to 
the poem's taking full possession of him. His grasping it thus needs lead to 
no other act than that of his dwelling on it, as we may dwell on a bouquet of 
flowers or a stalking cat. Stendhal left us a phrase that, however interpreted, is 
false: 
"Beauty is a promise of happiness." But beauty is not a promise, but a 
bestowal, not to be enjoyed elsewhere, later, but here, now. This holds for the 
poem when read as poetry. 
This is to say that a poem is a complicated tissue of meanings and values 
expressed in and through the language by means of straight denotation, psycho 
logical connotation, imagery, allusions, and the large number of devices critics 
have studied, not the least important of which are the theme's organization and 
the aural quality of its language. To say "expressed in and through" is to utter 
a 
pleonasm for, at least in my papiamento, the word "expression" refers to the 
use of language not merely to point to things external and independent of the 
language, but to present things that are dependent on the language. 
That the meanings and values expressed by the poem do not make external 
reference seems to be an offensive notion to some critics. Years ago a very logical 
logician objected to Mrs. Langer's notion of a presentational symbol because it 
was a contradiction in terms. Of course it was, and so was Kant's disinterested 
interest. C. W. Morris borrowed the term "icon" to convey the same notion, but 
failed to do what he set out to do. Linguistically odd also is Dewey's notion of 
immanent 
meanings. These are all efforts?call them desperate if you will?to draw 
attention to the essential peculiarity of poetry, its capacity for possessing ex 
clusively internal reference. Read as poetry it is intrinsically meaningful, but 
denotation external to the poem is not encountered in it. This is not peculiar to 
poetry. We frequently look for the sake of seeing, as when we fix our attention 
on the stalking cat just mentioned. And pure mathematics is a body of knowledge, 
the noblest of them all, some think, that does not refer to a world outside itself. 
3 
Although what I have just sketched is a repetition, as I said, of doctrine that is to 
be found in print, I had to review it here, in order to ground the statement that 
the self-sufficiency of poetry accounts in part for the sense of reality it conveys 
to the captive reader. His captivity is made possible by a number of factors 
analyzed by critics when they focus on the poem's unity. But also, and most 
importantly, by the nature of symbolic language. In the chapter from which I 
quoted James's vivid phrase, Chapter XXI, Vol. II, of The Principles of Psy 
chology, he points out that we live in several worlds. James described seven of 
them, but pointed out that the number is of no importance, nor does he expect 
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us to 
agree with his list. What is of importance for us is his comment. He wrote: 
"Every object we think of, gets at last referred to one world or another of this or 
some similar list" (II, 293). In the list, under No. 5, he places the worlds of 
poetry. Compressing the account, No. 5 reads as follows: 
(5) The various supernatural worlds . . . Each of these is a consistent 
system of definite relations among its own parts 
. . . The various 
worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with those worlds of faith? 
the world of the Illiad, that of King Lear, of the Pickwick Papers, etc. 
(292) 
At this point he attaches a footnote that is, for our purposes at least as 
important as the text. He writes : 
Whilst absorbed in the novel [Ivanhoe] we turn our backs on all other 
worlds, and for the time the Ivanhoe-world remains our absolute 
reality. 
Note that it is James who writes "absolute reality." The statement needs 
qualification. The Ivanhoe-world is 
our absolute 
reality if we are absolutely ab 
sorbed by it. But while absolute absorption is common, I suspect, with children 
of bright minds, in adults it occurs along lines of specialized training, and our 
capacity for it diminishes with age. We have ample evidence that the feat of 
absolute 
absorption in art or an absorption close to it, is apparently one that 
the majority of people are incapable of. Even for those who can perform it, the 
realization of it depends on many external factors that I cannot pause to enu 
merate here. In the same footnote to which I have just referred, James goes on 
to say that 
When we wake from the spell ... we find a still more real world, 
which reduces Ivanhoe and all things connected with him to fictive 
status, and relegates them to 
one of the subuniverses grouped under 
No. 5. 
So far as his explanation goes, James is right when he implies that the sense 
of reality conveyed by the absorption in a poem does not give the poem an 
ontological status identical with the status possessed by the ordinary world. But 
while, for his purposes, this is all that James needs to say about the worlds of 
poetry, as contrasted with the world that for James and for the great majority 
of mankind is "a more real world," if we label the worlds of poetry "fictive," we 
shut the gate on the inquiry, precluding much needed enlightenment. 
For us, the problem does not arise from the fact that absorption in the poem 
yields a sense of superior reality. My acknowledgment, 
a moment 
ago, that there 
are those who sweat with conviction, does not give me the right to say that the 
poem, or something in it, has 
or does not have a status in being, similar 
or 
different from that which the objects of language have. Again, for James's pur 
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poses, all he needed to do was to distinguish the conviction with which the poem 
makes us sweat from the greater reality of the world when the sweat ends. Our 
purposes, however, demand of us that we indicate that we are faced with two 
different senses of reality. The conviction of reality with which we sweated a 
few moments ago, is to a large extent accounted for by 
our total or close-to-total 
absorption in the poem. The senses of all other realities have been effectively 
excluded while we were sweating in the captivity of the poem. The only world there 
was, then, for us, was that of the poem. But how can we sweat with the con 
viction of the reality of the object of the poem one moment and immediately upon 
escaping from its captivity, dismiss that reality cavalierly by calling it a "fictive" 
world? The world of the poem made us sweat. Dripping with sweat, we step out 
of it without trouble and enter the ordinary world, which James calls "the more 
real" world. But 
although 
more real, it does not put us to any strain whatever; 
in it we are as cool as if we were in an 
over-refrigerated 
room. Note, however, 
that the psychologist's hand has been quicker than our eye, for James switched 
from the puddle of conviction created by our sweating?a conviction that may 
or 
may not be correlated to knowledge?to a more real world, but one that in 
spite of its greater reality does not even cause our collars to wilt. 
Put in different terms, the word "fictive" is not self-explanatory. And this 
is one of the reasons we have a problem. We want to know what it is that makes 
the worlds of poetry "fictive." But there are some kinds of answers that I, at least, 
have rejected after analysis. I do not want to be told that fictions are the work 
of the imagination. This old gimmick of inventing faculties to explain phenomena? 
the dormitive virtue of Montpelier, the explanation of the obscure by the more 
obscure?leads to interesting verbal disputes that graduate students must be 
acquainted with, but that throw no light on the problems by which we are 
puzzled. Another 
answer I cannot 
accept is one in the other direction, given us 
by The Philosopher, when he tells us that poetry is more true than history be 
cause the former is about uni versais. This statement is inadmissible for a number of 
reasons. I'll mention one: It can 
only be advanced by a man who believes that 
all of us think abstractly and that what a poet does is to dramatize, put concrete 
dramatic flesh on the conceptual abstractions that he originally thought of. 
Poetry has also been said to be appearance and illusion. But neither of these 
characterizations advances our quest, since for a phenomenon to be an appear 
ance there must be a 
reality of which it is the appearance, and the same holds for 
illusion. It is fairly obvious that what these theories assert is what is more clearly 
asserted by the theory of imitation. Not that I do not know that there are a 
number of interpretations of the view expounded by The Philosopher in the 
Poetics. But I believe we can finally reduce these to two. The sophisticated 
view of imitation includes 
creativity as one of the powers of the maker and, hence, 
novelty in the thing made. I fail to see anything in the pages of The Philosopher 
that warrants such ad hoc patching. In any case it turns the theory into an 
attenuated form of the expression theory. The other version is true imitation, 
copying. This is the meaning that The Philosopher had in mind. A contemporary 
Aristotelian has stated it as follows: 
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The artist 
separates some form from the matter with which it is 
joined in nature?not, however, the 'substantial' form, but some form 
perceptive by sensation?and joins it anew to the matter of art, the 
medium he uses. 
All that needs to be said about this account of the making of a poem is 
that its crudity is incredible: all the more incredible, when we remember that it 
was 
proposed by one of the three or four greatest philosophers that our civilization 
has produced, and has been transmitted to us in the above words, at this date, 
without a warning about its crudity, by a man with a scholarly reputation. This 
account, I would suggest, applies to what I imagine is the making of a death 
mask: it also applies to the work of Rosa Bonheur and, specially, to the work of 
Nazi and Socialist realists. It also applies to the type of reportage that the demi 
literates of our 
society take to be genuine novels. I argued some time ago that 
when it is said to apply to music, all it does is expose the fatuity of one who 
believes that the pattern of our great compositions is like the pattern of human 
emotions prior to their information by the musical composition. Nor does any 
interpretation of imitation that I have ever come across apply to architecture. But 
that it 
applies to the making of 
a genuine poem?whether great or small?is in 
conceivable, and can easily be shown to be seriously in error. But it is not here 
possible to pursue this topic further. 
4 
While I have been considering imitation, I have been suggesting in passing?as 
the reader has 
already realized?what the various theories of expression seek to 
emphasize, each in its own philosophical context. We have long known that the 
act of 
expression is not a pressing out, as squeezing toothpaste from 
a tube. It is 
a 
synthesis in which the experiential matter that goes into the creative act, and 
the form or forms that inform it, are completely altered in their natures by inter 
action among themselves and with that which the creative mind adds out of its own 
spontaneity. The experiential matter is the stuff of life as the poet has lived it, 
including of course his experience with art and in our case, especially with 
poetry. A. C. Bradley analyzed this problem in his famous lecture, "Poetry for 
Poetry's Sake," but his terminology is somewhat fluid, and for this reason I have 
adapted to my own needs Dewey's term, "the matter for art." This is transmuted 
into what I call the informed substance, that is the finished poem, the public 
object that the poet and his readers read. Since the informed substance is the 
product of the creative activity, it is of course unlike any of the ingredients that 
made it up. The result, then, is a work of art, a poem that contains a modicum 
of genuine novelty. 
On this view, what I must examine is not the status in being of those ingredi 
ents of the poem that are left more or less untouched by the creative activity 
of the poet. These, as already indicated, have whatever status in being is claimed 
by ordinary mental objects. The ingredients of the poem that require examination 
are the genuinely novel 
ones. At the outset, however, I should call your attention 
121 Criticism 
to the fact that I believe that all symbolization, however ordinary or common 
place, is constitutive. 
Let us turn our attention for a moment to the nature of 
symbols, for every 
thing depends on our understanding them. The word "symbol" is used 
in Cassirer's 
sense. To do so, we must first distinguish symbols from signs. This usage can be 
taken as stipulative, but the distinction is real. Symbols are constitutive, and they 
never function in isolation; they always function as members of a system to which 
they usually have explicit relationships, but always have deeply rooted implicit 
ones. Signs denote that to which they refer in an extrinsic relationship, which is 
to say, that we can apprehend, 
or believe we can, the thing denoted, inde 
pendently of the sign by means of which we refer to it for the purposes of appre 
hension and communication. But symbols and what they symbolize 
are insep 
arable from one another, and not fully distinguishable. That is what was meant 
above when I said that the poem expresses its object in and through itself. One 
can 
speak of expressing what is symbolized?but the phrase is pleonastic. That what 
the poem expresses is expressed through its language creates 
no trouble, or seems 
not to. When it is asserted that the poem also expresses its object in the language, 
the statement gives trouble. 
Let us turn our attention therefore to what is expressed in the language of 
poetry. Here we face the central question. But a sufficient elucidation of it would 
call for a long discourse on the theory of constitutive symbols. Beyond the ex 
cathedra statement that symbols are constitutive, which is to say that the world 
is what it is for us because of the symbols we use to constitute it, here I can say 
no more. I can call attention to the fact that, in very general terms, this is 
a 
well known hypothesis, advanced by psychologists, ethnolinguists, and philoso 
phers other than the one in whose footsteps I am, at this point, following, Cassirer. 
But since there are those who refuse to believe that the language of poetry ex 
presses the object of the poem in as well as through itself, two tests can be 
suggested to show that those who reject the constitutive nature of symbolic 
structures are in error. 
The first test is to compare a poem, an English one for us, with 
a translation 
of it. I shall not undertake the analytic comparison here since it would lead us 
off on a road I do not want to travel, away from a purely theoretical, abstract, 
exposition. But it is one of the commonplaces of our day, and 
a true one, that 
poetry cannot be translated satisfactorily. We can give the argument of the 
original poem in a foreign language, but over and beyond this we cannot success 
fully go. To try it turns the tradutore into 
a tradit ore. We can also create a new 
language, as was done by Urquhart and James M abe. But the Rabelais of the 
one and La Celestina of the other, can only "convey the spirit" of the originals. 
We put it in this way to be kind to the traditori and let them off with a suspended 
sentence. This is very, very old hat. What has not been indicated is why this is 
the case. And the reason is that regnant theories of meaning have been theories 
of signs and not of symbols, and have failed to make clear why and how language, 
all the more so the language of poetry, is constitutive. 
The other test works on the same principle: Try to alter radically 
a piece 
of English verse, by changing the informed substance while sticking closely to 
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the argument. You may come up with something better than the original, but not 
with anything that can be called an exact equivalent of the original. Old hat 
again. 
5 
We return to our question: What is the status in being of those ingredients of the 
poem that are contributed to it by the creative act? If one denies genuine 
spontaneity, novelty, the question was answered in the second paragraph of this 
paper. If one affirms spontaneity, one is in deep trouble, because the only solu 
tion to the problem?at least the only one I can see?is one that is profoundly 
repugnant to the majority of our contemporary teachers of philosophy. 
In broad strokes, the solution runs something like this: The symbolic medium 
of language presents to us the informed substance of the poem. Like all media, 
language is ephemeral. But the informed meanings and values that constitute the 
object of the poem, in one sense are not ephemeral, for they do not have their 
source in existence, in the spacio-temporal realm. We all know that Galileo ban 
ished from what he called the real world?the world of classical mechanics?those 
qualities that later came to be known as secondary and tertiary. They have been 
kept out of this so-called real world by strong philosophical traditions. If we 
believe that values are functions of human life and can be explained exhaustively in 
psychological terms, the only kind of creativity that we can accept is that which 
comes from shuffling the components of experience. We are thrown back on John 
Locke's notion of mind?a tabula, before the birth of the child, so rasa that the 
fingerprints of an angel can be seen on it. On this view the dignity of poetry 
and the other arts is denied, for they are denied indispensability and, to come to 
our 
problem, on this view we cannot fully account for the 
sense of 
superior 
reality imparted to some of us by a poem. 
It is desirable to state candidly that, with Croce and Cassirer for guides, what 
I propose is to point the way back to some sort of platonism. I have written 
"some sort of" and write 
"platonism" in small case, because I do not want to 
make the greatest philosopher of our civilization, who also was one of its great 
poets, responsible for my views; and that, for two reasons: the first is that I have 
neither the learning nor the temperament to be 
a Platonist in 
capitals; and the 
second is that I cannot accept the psychology on which Plato?insofar as I 
understand him?grounded his theory of our knowledge of the forms. Plato be 
lieved that we are endowed with the faculty of Reason, which trained in the 
proper moral and cognitive manner, could be brought to apprehend forms in their 
immaculate purity. Note that the platonic theory of forms that I am alluding to 
here is a simplified travesty. It is mentioned only to make the point that while I 
believe it is necessary to assert that forms have status in being that is more than 
nominal, I cannot agree with Plato that all forms can be apprehended by us in 
their full purity. When we come upon them, we find them informing matter. It 
is the substanced form, or the informed substance, that the poet offers us for 
our perception. Neither can a philosopher get at any other kind of poetry. The 
beauty of the Iliad, King Lear, and not to quarrel with James's taste, even Ivan 
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hoe, is the only kind of beauty that we'll ever be able to grasp. Or perhaps I 
should say, that the majority of men are ever able to grasp: for Plato seems to 
have been 
capable of 
an 
experience not given to the majority of men. Pure forms, 
untainted by matter, pure intelligible objects, are objects fully accessible to men. 
But ordinarily we would hardly call them beautiful. If, as it seems, such objects 
were for Plato the highest form of beauty, ordinary men would say they can 
hardly be expected to emulate such severity. But you have already noted that 
this is too rough and simplifying a way of disposing of the difficult and unyielding 
problem of the beauty of intelligible objects?whether in mathematics, m taphysics, 
or wherever they are to be found. That beauty can be claimed for them I do not 
wish to deny; indeed, I affirm it. But they do not fall within the purview of 
ordinary aesthetics because they lack what Prall called aesthetic surface. 
6 
The critic 
may reply: informed substance as an object of contemplation is not 
something over which there needs be quarrel. The question that is going to 
divide us is the source of the forms that do the informing and of the substance 
that is informed. How did they come about? In short, what do you have to say 
about the creative 
experience, to make us take seriously the claim you make for 
genuine spontaneity in the mind and genuine novelty in the object? 
I am going to tell you a story about the act of creation. At present, I be 
lieve, that is the best that can be done in non-mechanistic terms. And it is because 
little is known about that aspect of the act of making a poem, as distinct from 
copying, or of anything else for that matter, that takes place below the level of 
consciousness. It is below this level where I believe the genuinely creative part 
of the act takes place. If for any reason, we do not like the notion of the un 
conscious, we will have to say that the creative act?or that part of it hidden from 
inspection?takes place in our organism, chiefly perhaps in the brain. I believe 
much is lost and little gained?if anything at all?by pushing the act of creation 
from the psychological to the physiological level. For all the troubles we have 
with the notion of the unconscious, it does help to tie up a lot of phenomena 
that before its Freudian 
meaning came into use, remained uncorrelated. But the 
unconscious I have in mind is, if you like, a bastard unconscious, not the pure 
blooded, rigidly deterministic, nineteenth-century notion Freud left us. The cre 
ative act is an act that involves some 
spontaneity, genuine creativity. Below the 
reach of self-awareness, the miracle takes place. And if anyone charges that the 
dirty word I just used, the word "miracle," puts me among the obscurantists, I will 
ask him to give us a non-mechanistic explanation of the creative act. When he 
does, I shall withdraw the word "miracle" and apologize for using it. In the 
meantime, I beg you to remember Freud's words: "Before the problem of the 
creative artist 
analysis must, alas, lay down its arms." Freud of course meant 
psychoanalysis, but the statement applies to behavioral analysis all the more, 
or any kind of analysis so far known. 
It should be noted that I have been considering the creative activity and 
not its occasion. A poet may undertake to make a poem on order, or be 
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cause "the germ of the story," in Henry James's phrase, is suggested to him 
at a dinner party; or because a friend dies by drowning or is killed in the bull 
ring; or quite accidentally, it is suggested to him as he dips a bit of cake. Nor do 
I want to convey the idea that the act takes place entirely out of the reach of 
consciousness and somehow free from the trained skills, the accepted conventions, 
the rules if you allow the word, and the rest of the multitude of guiding habits 
formulated or not, that direct the poet in his choosing and rejecting forms, themes, 
images, and the rest of the components that criticism tells us make up the fin 
ished 
object. But the conscious process is not wholly unknown, as I believe the 
unconscious is. I have referred to the conscious 
activity in passing, under the 
rubric of the labor of the file, because I am chiefly concerned with emphasizing 
the unconscious 
activity in order to focus on the status in being of the meanings 
and values that the creative act discovers. The thesis, if I may repeat, is that if we 
take the creative act 
seriously, the values and meanings that in one sense must 
be said to be the product of discovery are in another sense the product of genuine 
creativity. It is the novelty imported by creativity that in part elicits the con 
viction of reality with which we sweat. Thus, if status in being at the spacio 
temporal level, at the level of existence, were the only realm of being, my prob 
lem would not be susceptible of solution. 
The poet creates meanings and values, since before the act of making the 
poem, he knew nothing about them, or very little, and what he knew, if anything, 
was obscure and inchoate?which is to say he did not really know them. But to 
create them he had to dive to the very bottom of his mind, way below the level 
of awareness, in order to discover them. A better metaphor than that of the diver 
would be the following: The creative mind somehow stirs its own bottom, 
roiling what has been turbidly settled on it, thus seeking to bring up to the 
surface of awareness what it has disturbed. It wants something although it does 
not know, or does not know clearly, what it wants. But the other metaphor is 
easier to handle in a succinct manner. The poet dives into the darkness. He feels 
what he is looking for but does not really know what it is; it is something, matter 
without form, and forms free from the substance they are always found informing 
at the level of awareness. Stuff without 
shape and shape without stuff: here are 
two basic ingredients of the creative act. But we have to add the power of the 
poet's mind that we may assume brings about the synthesis. We call it his cre 
ative energy, or the primary imagination. I would not talk about the act by 
saying it was a rehearsal of the primordial act of creation, but there is no ob 
jection to saying that it is a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation. This language has been used, not to conceal our thought, but to cam 
ouflage our ignorance. There is no objection to using language in this way as 
long as we keep vividly before our minds just what we are doing. The trouble 
begins when we take these verbal disguises to be genuine explanations. 
Much more light is needed on the most puzzling aspect of creativity. To 
the mechanistic mind, of course, the light is not considered anything but obscur 
antistic darkness. Again, I do not claim the following remarks to be an explana 
tion. Like Coleridge's words, they represent an effort to catch a bird that is not 
there by putting salt on its tail with an empty saltshaker. Let us imagine a spider 
125 Criticism 
that has been forced to produce thread beyond its capacities by the food we have 
given it. Such is the creative mind. It produces out of itself beyond the matter 
and forms for art that it has taken in. What it finally produces comes both from 
formal and material resources that have been imported and also from that which 
is contributed by the poet out of his own private, home-made resources. The 
spider has been fed, but the food it took does not account exhaustively for the 
amount and quality of the thread it produced. It is this, the poet's own, totally 
idiotic, contribution, that gives his product the brilliant power of absorption that is 
its novelty. The feeling of reality turns out to be more than mere feeling. It 
comes to the 
object not merely because of the subject's near absolute absorption 
in the object, but also because the object possesses, as the result of a genuinely 
creative act, much more than is available to the rest of us prior to the poet's 
making of his poem. 
Nominalistic and scientistic minds will find this story ridiculous because John 
Locke did his job so well that in spite of Leibniz, who demolished the first book 
of the Essay, Locke convinced the empiricists, British and French, that the 
notion of innate ideas was philosophically deplorable. And why? It does not take 
close 
reading to see that Locke's theoretical argument against innate ideas was 
in error, because he did not understand what the term "innate idea" meant, and 
that the gravamen of his criticism was purely ideological?innate ideas were the 
refuge of absolutism. But Leibniz's answer was the basis of a more adequate 
notion of the mind than that of the British empiricists. There is nothing in the 
mind other than that which comes from experience, said Locke. Yes, nothing said 
Leibniz, except the mind itself. 
We all know that the guards of the tabula rasa orthodoxy have kept in line a 
large number of thinkers in England, the United States, and at least in the 
eighteenth century, in France. The faith in it is strong and the sanctions against 
those who stray from the orthodoxy are harsh. The contrary belief has recently 
been called 
"disgusting" by a reputed teacher of philosophy. Nor is he the only 
one confronted with heresy, to display the irenic temperament of a rational mind. 
However, at this very moment, as you know, the faith in the tabula rasa is 
threatened by a few rebels from a discipline from which, I dare say, the regime 
expected no trouble?the linguistic. But I feel that while in philosophy one 
can't look gift horses too closely in the mouth, and that the help against the en 
trenched orthodoxy brought us by some linguists is welcome, we did not really 
need this help. Long before it arrived some of us were confident that the tabula, 
even John Locke's own baby tabula, had never been entirely rasa, but had many 
scratches on it before old Locke let out his first baby wail. It is however gratifying, 
if to nothing else, to one's vanity, to be able to greet the linguistic volunteers 
who are helping us push the tabula rasists into the cave of paleo-empiricism. 
Concerned with advancing a theory of the genesis of the "matter for art" 
used by the human mind that was not mechanistic, Jung told a different kind of 
story than the one I sketched above. He was interested in the philogenetic side of 
the problem. And to make some headway into the puzzle he had to introduce 
some weird characters into his story: a collective unconscious, a racial memory, 
and numerous archetypes. Why these characters should have brought down on 
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Jung's learned head the implacable contempt that has been heaped on it, is a 
story that does not exactly belong here. Enough to say that it is one of the many 
proofs we have of the open mind of contemporary thinkers. 
I have introduced Jung, not to declare my agreement with him but to point 
out that we are faced with a genuine problem. Stories do not solve it. But at 
least they indicate with some clarity where mechanistic, scientistic, explanations 
fail. 
We must still ask the question: Does the diver, of whom I was speaking 
above, use ingredients that he did not create in the making of his poem? I return 
to this question to emphasize strongly that the creative act does not create al 
together out of nothing. Probably the largest amount of informed substance is 
discovered. But the poet manages to alter what he finds or discovers, as well as 
what he creates. In the 
making of 
a poem there is creation and there is dis 
covery. The individual talent does not work outside a tradition. 
I hope that this story has done what stories sometimes do, that is, throw light 
on the act of creation, by pointing out why genuine creativity remains so far 
unexplained. Trusting that it did, we 
are now able to finish our discussion. 
We have seen that a psychological explanation accounts to some extent for 
the conviction of 
reality that a poem sometimes elicits. But this conviction arises 
also from the revealed 
meanings and values that the reader grasps. These are, 
to some extent, at least, new for the reader. And to that extent they lend radiance 
to the object of the poem. The object of the poem, more "utterly utter," is the 
product of genuine creativity. 
We have arrived at the end of the tour. I do not claim originality for the 
views I have presented to you. In philosophy, originality is somewhat suspect. 
I can easily name some of the sources from which I have helped myself generously. 
Croce, the Bradley of the inaugural lecture, "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," Samuel 
Alexander, and other thinkers, the majority idealists, like the John Dewey of 
Art As Experience. The doctrine I have put before you is offered as a sort of 
Platonism. It may not be the real Plato, for scholars are still fighting as to who 
is in possession of the true mummy. But there is something about my Plato that 
gives me confidence that I have presented to you a somewhat recognizable por 
trait, and that is his bushy beard. If you remember how that formidable philos 
opher, Quine, as he was recently called, and a large majority of contemporary 
teachers of philosophy, cordially detest the bushy beard of Plato, and with hands 
devoid of piety would shave it off, I flatter myself that the beard is bushy 
enough for my picture to be true Plato. May I close by claiming with diffidence 
that whether I have presented to you the real Plato, or a pseudo-Plato, or no 
Plato at all but the product of my ignorance exclusively, it has been with the aid 
of someone I have taken for Plato that I have tried to get at the complexities 
of poetry that neither the defenders of the tabula rasa, nor the champions of 
positivistic philosophy of science, 
nor nominalists, nor linguistic analysts can ap 
proach. 
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